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The integration of Europe is indeed a very long process, which reaches far
back in history (Ješovnik ). Besides the Ancient Greeks, the Romans
paved the way for a United Europe. Even though the Roman Empire
eventually collapsed they left behind Latin tradition, civil law and com-
mon religion – Christianity. It was exactly the Roman Catholic Church
who followed the Roman tradition in unifying the European continent
several centuries later. Even though the church had primarily ideologi-
cal goals it was rather the common enemy – Islam – as a decisive factor,
which enabled the Church to unify Europe again.
Why is this important today? Some would claim there is no relevance,
others would think of a clash of Civilizations, but in our view there is at
least one correlation. Thus Europe is more integrated after , while it
has a common enemy again. Namely, the globalisation process as such,
and therefore Europe needs to improve its competitiveness in the world.
Globalisation is not a new term at all (Mercado ). We can claim
that globalisation has been present for several centuries. However, it has
never been so intensive as in the last  years. Globalisation is the process
of international economic integration. In short, globalisation is nothing
else but the squeezing of time and space! In principle, globalisation is the
consequence of market structures that promote eﬃciency, competitive-
ness and specialization at the global level. Technological modernization
(), reduction of international trade barriers and new organization
of international transactions has caused very fast globalisation, which
raises many questions. Those who speak in favour of globalisation, think
that globalisation conveys economies of scale: optimal allocation of cap-
ital and in such a way provides economic eﬃciency and consequently a
higher living standard. On the other hand the critics are concerned that
globalisation does nothing else but widens the gap between the rich and
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Table :  integration process
Period Objectives Integration solutions
’s Peace and development Establishment of Communities
’s Extraordinary growth of trade Custom Union
’s First crises 
’s New vision Delors package
’s New structure Pillars
. Century New challenges Triangle
the poor. In their opinion globalisation is destroying equality and a good
living standard all around the globe.
The fact is that globalisation has been present ever since, whether we
like it or not. The relevant question is not whether to accept the chal-
lenges of globalisation or not, but how to be optimal in this global eco-
nomic and political power play. It seems that the  is now fully aware
of this fact. In such a world order, a divided Europe could not provide
the needed macroeconomic environment which would enable compet-
itiveness of European companies at the global level. In the past there
where too many trade obstacles within the European market large scale
economies and a strong European  could not develop as it could
have. The establishment of an internal market and the introduction of
the euro removed most of above-mentioned barriers. Even though the
liberalization and integration processes in Europe were taking place par-
allel to the globalisation process, we notice that  is lagging behind the
most powerful competitors like the  or Japan (European Commis-
sion d). This is why the Union is faced with structural development
issues, which must be solved in due time in order to prevent further de-
cline of the high living standard and social welfare.
Ever since then the  has been focused on internal problems and
the permanent restructuring process rather than on the globalisation
process (European Commission b). Undoubtedly it has been very
successful in integrating European national states over the last  years.
First, the Community successfully introduced the customs union back in
. With the fifth enlargement, the common market will spread itself
almost throughout the continent. Throughout the integration process
 will gradually increase to double the population of the . Second,
the Union had successfully upgraded the common market by establish-
ing the . Introducing the euro was by now a most successful project,
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and for the first time in integration history the citizens of the  got
something real in their hands as a result of the integration process. This
is a completely new and important development. On the other hand,
one cannot deny the weakness of the established system. Having intro-
duced the euro without a common fiscal policy is indeed rather an am-
bitious act than a wise strategy. Third, the  has shown no hesitation in
establishing trans-European networks. The common infrastructure en-
ables European business to become more and more competitive. Indeed,
we must recognize that in the history of Europe there have never been
better infrastructure conditions. Fourth, in the meanwhile institutions
in Brussels started to run common  policies. Coherent common for-
eign trade, or environment, or research policy for example are making
the European macroeconomic environment not only more predictable
but above all supportive for European business at the global level. Many
still claim that the above mentioned policies are too far from the real-
ities and needs of the European business community, but one should
insist that it does make a big diﬀerence to have them at all. Finally, the
Community has been under permanent restructuring ever since. In a
way this sounds strange, yet on the other hand it can become an impor-
tant competitive advantage. Although many critics say  is too rigid,
recent history teaches us that nothing lasts in  for good. However, the
last decade has brought a new dimension. In short, we can say that re-
form has becomemuch more structured and sensible. It is systematically
run on three levels:
. Convention – is nothing else but a first step towards political union.
It follows the Philadelphia experience as historical best practice.
Most important in such a democratic way it was very successful in
providing a new constitution treaty for the Union. The new consti-
tution will have, in the long run, a significant influence on further
development of the aquis communitaire.
. Formulating the Lisbon strategy as new economic strategy of the 
stressing the importance of the knowledge based society.
. Last but not least, preparing a new agenda (-/) as Com-
munity budget document which will support in the long run only
those priorities, which are in line with the Lisbon Strategy.
If the above mentioned were the good news then we have to mention
bad news too (Sapiro ). First, the Community has in due time estab-
lished a system that has worked well till the mid s. This is the system
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Figure : The reform of the  structures
that was designed according to the existing technologies, was suitable
for massive production and the economies of scale, where there were
mostly big, vertically connected firms with stable markets and long-term
employment. With the elimination of restrictions the Community had
continuosly raised the domestic competition and had pushed the Eu-
ropean economy into the continuosly reconstruction. However, the lat-
est happened more or less because of the inter-European linkages with
the extensive racionalization of the economy and in order to obtain
the economies of scale. Consequently, a lot of job positions were lost
with few new ones available. At the same time, the outside competition
came along with the globalization, which only worsened European job-
creating possibilities. In this regard the  is without doubts the num-
ber one challenge. They have been leading in the area of production for
the last  years and they have been attracting the brain-drain from all
over the world. China made it clear that it wants to become the strongest
industrialization force in the world. This is an indirect threat to the Eu-
ropean (as well as to Slovenian) industry. At the same time India is se-
riously threathening the service sector in the . The fact, that the Eu-
ropean multi-nacionals carry through most of their & outside the 
members, makes the picture of the competition capacity of the European
economy pretty pale (European Commission b).
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Furthemore, it is true that the Union is successfully solving the fu-
nadamental integration eﬀorts, the problem of the makroeconomic sta-
bility and the principle of cohesion. However, it has forgotten to tacle the
fundamental problem of every economy: sustainable economic growth,
which consists of three factors: the ageing of the population, the new
technologies and the outgrowing globalization. For the time being the
 has not prepared proper answers. This is one of the biggest challenges
that lie ahead of Europe.
To continue with Third, the  has to change most of its traditional
policies and instruments in order to tackle the above mentionted prob-
lems. If the Lisbon strategy is the  economic strategy, then everything
must be in accordence to it. There is no room left for the old-fashioned
instruments anymore.
Even though that the Union is still seen as the biggest ‘fortress’ of pur-
chasing power and of living standard in the world, it is becoming clearer
that there are more and more challenges to come as the sustainable com-
petence advantages. In the mean time, the Union has become entan-
gled into the global structural processes. Slovenes are entering the 
at a time when the Union is to face enormous developmental challenges.
Nevertheles, we are entering into integration processes that had set itself
a strategic goal in Lisbon (European Commission e) at : ‘to be-
come the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world and will be able of sustainable growth and more quality job-
creating and environmentally inclusive economy’.
The  needs a new developmental paradigm (Sapiro ) which also
holds true for Slovenia (Damijan et al. ). If the  succeeded to over-
come the biggest crises in the ’s then we don’t see the reason why it
wouldn’t succeed today, when there are much better institutional solu-
tions. Slovenia has always been diﬀerent from other transitional coun-
tries and it has always stressed the importance of soft social factors in
terms of development. The Slovene economic developmental paradigm
was not determinated economically. The Slovenes have always consid-
ered the development as a category that includes far broader historical,
social, cultural, political and other developmental perspectives. If Slove-
nia wants to remain successful and economically developing country, it
will have to design new – time adjusted and business friendly environ-
ments – with suitable social and intellectual capital (Kovacˇ ; Jaklicˇ
and Coticˇ Svetina ).
In this sense we need an improved managerial system that will partic-
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ularly stress our needs and experiences. We are talking about new equal
combination of managerial ideas, approaches and identities that will in-
tegrate the unwritten system of managerial directions and business prac-
tices in Slovenia. These practices have to be based upon the experiences
of Slovene firms that proved most successful in demanding global condi-
tions and achieved great business results. We also need new and innova-
tive organisational methods and systems, be it the only way to transform
ourselves from knowledge importer to knowledge exporter.
Since the managerial paradigms arise from: i) global, technological,
economical and social changes, ii) changes in the organisational struc-
ture as well as business practice, iii) the managerial and leadership prac-
tice, it is clear that the entrance in the  will demand important changes
in that field. According to some European experiences it is possible to re-
vive the practice of the Slovene leadership while stressing the culture of
business partnership, on the basis of intellectual capital and knowledge-
thirsty organizations. With regular revival of business processes, based
on eﬀective measures of business changes and strategic development
planning.
 
A society of the future is the society of knowledge, in which the capabil-
ity of knowledge concentration and transformation into innovative and
applicative solutions are important and respected values. Knowledge has
become the central resource of the new society where knowledge work-
ers are key elements of its work force (Peklar , –). There is no limit
for knowledge-based society. Knowledge can be gained faster than ever
because it moves faster than any other production factor. Modern com-
munication and information technologies made it easier to get to the in-
formation. Yet it is still hard to gain applicable knowledge in this jungle
of information.
Knowledge as a key element of future society diﬀers from all other
classical production factors. The resources of knowledge are endless. The
use of knowledge does not destroy them; on the contrary, it makes them
even more valuable. The knowledge gained in the past sticks around (is
kept in our minds?). The Romans would say: Omnia mea mecum porto.
We can sell it but we still own it. The same knowledge can be shared with
many people. The only limitation to it is the human ability.
The main objective for the European Union is to find a way to face
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the challenges of the global economy. Creating a knowledge society is
the best and probably the only way to achieve this. Innovations, techno-
logical modernisation, applicative use of knowledge and top design will
benefit to the European society and all its inhabitants.
Key Indicators of Knowledge Based Society in the European Union
The basic strategy for achieving the knowledge society was set with the so
called Lisbon goals (European Commission ). At the Lisbon sum-
mit in March , Europe’s heads of state declared their ambition to
make the European Union ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge based economy in the world by , capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’.
This broad objective includes an increase in the employment rate from
an average of  percent in the  today to an average of  percent
by , or  million additional jobs, and an  average annual real
growth rate of three percent, considerably higher than the average of .
percent over the past ten years. To achieve it, the heads of state adopted
the Lisbon Strategy, a far-reaching agenda combining short-term politi-
cal initiatives and medium- and long-term economic reforms (European
Commission e; World Economic Forum ).
An information society for all. The objective is to broaden the access to
the Internet and to produce content that adds value to Europe’s cultural
and scientific heritage. Businesses and citizens must have access to an in-
expensive, world-class communication infrastructure and a wide range
of services. Every citizen must be equipped with the skills needed to live
and work in this new information society. By creating the conditions for
‘eEurope’ the use of information technologies should be spread among
schools and companies. The Internet should turn into the main instru-
ment for transmission of information, communication, transactions and
media in the Europe. The rules for electronic commerce must be pre-
dictable and should inspire business and consumer confidence.
Establishing a European Area of Research and Innovation. By establishing
a European Area of Research and Innovation  wants to ensure that
Europe oﬀers attractive prospects to its best brains. This will be achieved
with:
• improving the environment for private research investment, &
partnerships and high technology start-ups,
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• coordination of national policies and existing community programs
by networking & programs and institutions,
• removing obstacles to the mobility of researchers in Europe to at-
tract and retain high-quality research talent in Europe, encouraging
the coordination for benchmarking national research and develop-
ment policies and creating partnership between business commu-
nity and universities,
• creating a Community patent.
Strong priority is given to innovation policies and financial support to
& activities. In December  the  approved the outline of its th
Framework Programme, under which it will spend  . billion on
scientific initiatives over the next four years.
Creating a friendly environment for starting up and developing innovative
businesses, especially s. The competitiveness and dynamism of busi-
nesses are directly dependent on a regulatory climate conducive to in-
vestment, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Further eﬀorts are required
to lower the costs of doing business and remove unnecessary red tape,
both of which are particularly burdensome for s. Creating better
conditions for entrepreneurship is the objective of an enterprise policy
that goes beyond the existing community programme. Coordination of
national policies is required in particular to achieve a simplification of
administrative procedures, better access to venture capital, and improved
manager training.
Economic reforms for a complete and fully operational internal market.
The implementation of the internal market remains incomplete and
severely fragmented. Costs of doing business in Europe are still con-
sidered as too high. The services and utilities sectors are of particular
concern. While telecommunication markets were liberalized by ,
liberalization of gas and electricity markets is still incomplete. Therefore
some more work is required in order to complete the internal market in
certain sectors and to improve under-performance in others in order to
ensure the interests of business and consumers. The state aids needs to
be reduced and redirected towards horizontal objectives, such as support
for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Eﬃcient and integrated financial markets. Improving the eﬃciency and
integration of European financial markets and the conditions for invest-
ment financing in Europe is facilitated with:

 on the Way to Knowledge Society
• the Risk Capital Action Plan to be implemented by  and
• Financial Services Action Plan to be implemented by .
So far,  of the  proposals of the Financial Service Action Plan have
been adopted.
Social inclusion through bringing people back to work, upgrading skills and
modernizing social protection. Promoting employment and creating new
jobs is the most important safeguard against the social tensions and in-
justices arising from long-term unemployment and the exclusion of cer-
tain groups from the labour market. Social inclusion, the labour market
aspect of the Lisbon Strategy, works by investing in people, active labour
market policies, and mitigating labour market frictions resulting from
existing systems of social protection. Targets are to raise employment
rates to  percent employment for women and  percent for persons
aged – and to reduce the share of low-skilled persons in the popula-
tion aged – by one half.
Sustainable development. Sustainable development, ensuring long-term
quality of life, was the objective added to the Lisbon agenda at the Stock-
holm European Council in March . Specific targets were set to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions by eight percent from  levels by 
and to prioritize public and environmentally friendly forms of transport.
Four priority areas have been identified for immediate action: climate
change, public health, transport and natural resources.
  
Innovation is a central element of the knowledge based economy and
therefore a key force of the Lisbon objective. The  report (Cowan
and van de Paal , ) defined innovation policy as ‘a set of policy ac-
tions to raise the quantity and eﬃciency of innovative activities, whereby
innovative activities refer to the creation, adaptation and adoption of
new or improved products, processes, or services’. At the level of the firm
or the institution these activities are undertaken to introduce new and
improved products, processes or services to increase productivity, profits
or market share, with the ultimate goal to increase their competitiveness
in the long run.
Innovation in a knowledge-based economy is diverse and pervasive.
It is not just based on research, or science and technology, or enterprise
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Table : The roadmap of the Lisbon strategy
  State aid scoreboard and register
Strategy for simplifying the regulatory environment (some delay)*
 New framework for public procurement ( deadline for agreement missed)
 New framework for electronic commerce* (except  treatment of
e-commerce where  deadline for agreement missed)
First two-year National Action Plans against exclusion and poverty
Social Policy Scoreboard
 New framework for telecommunications
Single market for risk capital
Further opening of electricity markets for business customers
Sixth Framework Programme for research
Community Patent* ( deadline for agreement missed)
 Liberalization of international rail freight using trans-European rail networks
 Single European Sky
Further opening of gas market for business customers*
Energy tax framework*
Framework for the taxation of savings
 Single market for all financial services*
Opening of gas and electricity markets for residential customers
Start of a mandatory European emission trading scheme for 2***
 Second stage of opening of market for postal services
  Liberalization of all international rail freight
Galileo satellite navigation system enters into operation* ( deadline for
agreeing structure missed)
 Possible new or final stage of opening of markets for postal services (subject
to study in  on the impact of liberalization)
Source: European Commission e.
 indicates necessary measures adopted/taken.
* indicates that the target date risks being missed because of insuﬃcient progress.
and ingenuity – although all of these remain very important contribut-
ing factors. Innovation also depends on organisational, social, economic,
marketing and other knowledge. It frequently requires intellectual and
artistic creativity. There is an increasing emphasis on such ‘intangible
assets’ within firms. Innovation is therefore nothing but the process of
constant learning (European Commission a, ).
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The current European Innovation Policy is based on the Innovation
Action Plan arising from the December  Green Paper on Innova-
tion. As the European economy becomes increasingly knowledge-based,
and innovation processes are transformed, new approaches to innova-
tion policy need to be considered.  report identified a number of
policy priorities for the knowledge-based economy (Cowan and van de
Paal , ):
•  exploitation. Advantage should be taken by European firms and
institutes to exploit the possibilities and opportunities that s of-
fer. These s enable increased interconnectivity between knowl-
edge agents through (virtual) networking.
• Knowledge Mobility and Training. The importance of tacit and spe-
cialized knowledge calls for greater mobility of knowledge workers
and investments in training and education.
• Intellectual Property Rights (patents, copyrights, design registra-
tion) can be important instruments to codify and commodify
knowledge and hence, the diﬀusion of knowledge. Their dissemi-
nation and use should be further stimulated, while keeping in mind
the limitations of s as a dissemination mechanism.
• Funding conditions (financial and fiscal) should be geared to more
innovative risk-taking and better rewards thereof.
How Innovative is Europe
Since , the European Commission has published the European In-
novation Scoreboard () as an instrument for the annual follow-up
of the Lisbon strategy. This document (European Commission c)
includes data from Candidate countries and from the  regions, in ad-
dition to the data on the  Member States, the  and Japan.
The   confirms that the innovation performance of the  is
still low compared to its main global competitors. Japan leads the  in
eight of the ten indicators for which comparable data are available and
the  leads for seven. For new & graduates and public & expendi-
tures, the  and  averages are very close. The only significant  lead
within the triad is its lead over Japan in home Internet access. The trends
show more encouraging situation. Overall positive trend results suggest
that the  may be catching up with its main competitors.
The world’s leading countries for many innovation indicators are
found within the . The leading innovative countries in the  are the
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smaller northern economies, including Finland, Sweden, Denmark and
the Netherlands. Sweden appears  times, Finland  times, the Nether-
lands five times, Denmark four times and Ireland two times. Of the larger
 economies, the  leads with four slots, followed by Germany with
three. France appears once and Italy not at all. For seven of the ten com-
parable indicators, the  leaders are ahead of both the  and Japan.
Ireland, France, Finland, the  and Sweden lead in new & gradu-
ates; Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands in public &; Sweden and
Finland in business &; Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands in high-
technology  patents; Luxembourg, Spain and the Netherlands in new
capital raised; the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark in home internet
access; and Sweden, the  and the Netherlands in  expenditures.
The Candidate countries perform favourably compared to the  for
tertiary education (with Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia and Lithuania equal
to or above the  mean), employment in high-tech manufacturing
(with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia close to or
above the  mean),  expenditures (with the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary and Slovakia above the  mean), and the stock of inward
 (with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Malta above the
).
Third Generation of Innovation Policy
Many documents, working papers, reports and other publications about
innovations in the  prove that the stimulation of innovation activi-
ties is in the centre of the  attention (Bucˇar and Stare ). However,
much more needs to be done. The report Innovation Tomorrow (Euro-
pean Commission a) has introduced the third generation innova-
tion policy, which fits best the concept of knowledge based economy and
society.
The st generation of innovation policy was based on the idea of a
linear process for the development of innovations. This process begins
with laboratory science and moves through successive stages till the new
knowledge is built into commercial applications that diﬀuse in the eco-
nomic system. The emphasis of policy was on fostering critical direc-
tions of scientific and technological advance, and enhancing the flow of
knowledge down along the innovation chain.
The nd generation of innovation policy recognises the complexity
of the innovation system, with many feedback loops between the diﬀer-
ent stages of the innovation process. Within the so called ‘innovation
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Table : Some indicators of innovation policy in years  and 
Indicator  
leaders
  leaders   
. New & graduates
(‰ of – years age
class)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . . .
. Population with tertiary
education (% of –
years age classes)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . . .
. Participation in life-long
learning (% of – years
olds)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . – –
. Employment in medium-
high and high-tech
manufacturing (% of total
workforce)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . – –
. Employment in high-tech
services (% of total
workforce)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . – –
. Public & expenditures
( – , % )
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . . .
. Business expenditure on
& (, % )
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . . .
. All patent applications at
the European patent oﬃce
(per million population)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . . .
. High-tech patent
applications at the 
patent oﬃce (per million
population)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . . .
. High-tech venture capital
investment (% of )
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . – –
. Internet access
(% of population)
. . ()
. ()
. ()
. . () . . .
.  expenditures
(% of )
. . ()
. ()
. ()
– . () . . .
. Stock of inward 
(% of )
. – – . () – – –
Source: European Commission c.
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systems’ (national, regional, sectorial, etc.) there is more focus on the
generation and diﬀusion of innovations. The need is to enhance two-
way communication across diﬀerent points in the innovation ‘chain’, and
to improve innovation systems in ways that can better inform decisions
about research, commercialisation, technology adoption and implemen-
tation.
The rd generation of innovation policy would place innovation at the
heart of each policy area. The common aim is to maximise the chances
that regulatory reform will support innovation objectives, rather than
run the risk of impeding or undermining them. The creation of a third
generation innovation policy should be a political objective (European
Commission a, –).
Research and Technological Development
Science and technology play a key role in the knowledge-based economy
– they are the source of knowledge itself, and therefore they represent
a key competitiveness booster (European Commission a). Invest-
ment in research and technology is responsible for % to %economic
growth (European Commission b). Creating the European Area of
Research and Innovation within the European Knowledge Area is one of
the key steps in the Union’s path towards achieving Lisbon objective.
In order to transform the produced knowledge into the increased
growth, competitiveness and high quality, skilled employment, Europe
needs to invest more and invest better in research.
That led the Barcelona European Council in March  to set a new
objective: to increase & investments from .% in  to % of 
by . The share funded by business should rise to two-thirds of the
total.
Comparison of & expenditure in the  and in the  shows a
massive and rapidly growing gap, mostly due to lower funding by the
 business sector. In absolute terms, the gap in research investment be-
tween the  and the United States is already in excess of  billion Euro
per year (European Commission b).
Table  shows that with .%of its  allocated to & expenditure
in , the - increased its & intensity level by . percentage
points since . Amongst the triad, this level is still far behind Japan,
which comes at the top with a proportion of .% of  devoted to
&, while the  reached .%. Two  countries, Sweden (.%)
and Finland (.%), recorded & intensities higher than % and can
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Table : & expenditure as a percentage of ; all sectors, –
   
- .% .%  .%
 .% .%  .% .%
 .% .%  .% .%
 .% .%  .% .%
 .% .%  .% .%
 .% .%  .% .%
 .% .%  .% .%
 .% .%  .% .%
 .% .%  .% .%
Source: Frank . Exceptions to the  reference year , , , , ,  and :
; , ,  and : ; : .
Table : Percentage of & expenditure in constant  by institutional sector
 Japan 
 – Business enterprise sector % % %
 – Higher education sector % % %
 – Government % % %
 – Private non-profit sector % % %
Source: Frank . Exceptions to the  reference year Japan: .
compete with them Among the  countries with the largest economic
weight, Germany, France, the  and Italy, only the first two had &
intensity higher than the  average in .
At the institutional sector level, in , & expenditure as a %
of  in the - represented .% in the business enterprise sector
(), .% in the higher education sector () and .% in the
government sector (). The business sector accounts for % of &
expenditure in Europe, compared to % in Japan and % in the .
Meeting the % objective in the  is expected to create .% addi-
tional growth of  and , additional jobs every year after .
To make it easier to improve the European companies’ competitiveness
in the global economy, it is necessary to look first of all to the quan-
tity and quality of knowledge it relies on. Without enough researchers or
public and private investment in research, the  economy would stag-
nate, deprived of the knowledge, which is its driving force. To become
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the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, Europe
requires a new drive, with & as an essential component.
The Business Response to the % & Investment Objective
Overall, the business response strongly supports the need to increase re-
search eﬀorts to strengthen the  competitiveness, economic growth
and employment. The key challenge is to make Europe more attractive
for business & investment and innovation. The main messages are as
follows (European Commission b):
• Europe has to improve European centres of excellence, skills and ed-
ucation, build a more supportive regulatory environment for &
and innovation, and a strong and vibrant public research sector
with improved links with industry.
• A more coherent policy approach is needed, requiring on the one
hand, co-ordination of the & policies of the Member States as
well as the , and on the other hand, coherence between & pol-
icy and other policies such as competition, regional, environment,
industry and education policies.
• Industrial research is increasingly taking on a European and even
global dimension. Fragmentation of eﬀort, isolated national re-
search systems and disparities between legal and administrative
regimes certainly do not contribute to & investment. To foster
research in Europe and achieve the critical mass needed in cutting-
edge sectors, it is vital to open up, integrate and concentrate the
research eﬀort. The % objective and the European Research Area
are both crucial to restore confidence in the knowledge-based econ-
omy and to move out of the current crisis with a renewed growth
based on more and better & eﬀorts.

The article concludes that the  has to implement new and better strat-
egy as well as actions in order to achieve better competitiveness and
higher economic growth. For the last  years the  has been constantly
lagging behind its major competitors, the  and Japan. The  achieves
higher  per capita than the  through both higher labour produc-
tivity and higher employment input. This should imply that there is still
room for the  to grow faster than the  through the assimilation of
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existing technology and organisational practices and without trade-oﬀ
between employment and productivity. But after very rapid economic
growth in the early post-war period, the  economic convergence with
the  stopped in the beginning of  and the level of  per capita
at current prices has remained unchanged ever since at around % of
the  level.
This is the main reason for introducing the Lisbon objectives and
strategy. Economic policies, developed in the economic environment of
mass production generating the economy of scale and industrial struc-
ture dominated by large firms with stablemarkets and long term employ-
ment patterns no longer function in the world of today, characterised by
economic globalisation and strong international competition. Therefore
the  needs to develop policies that would foster less vertically inte-
grated firms, greater mobility within and across firms, more retraining,
greater flexibility of labour markets, greater availability of external fi-
nance, in particular equity finance, and higher investment in both &
and higher education.
Europe must become a knowledge-based society, capable of surviv-
ing in the very competitive global environment by achieving sustain-
able growth with more and better jobs, continuing price stability and a
greater economic and social cohesion. Increased eﬀort should be there-
fore put on making the Single Market more dynamic, boosting invest-
ment in knowledge, improving the macroeconomic policy framework
for the , redesigning policies for convergence and restructuring,
achieving more eﬀectiveness in decision-taking and regulation and re-
focusing the  budget.
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